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SHORT ARTICLE

Genetic Attributions: Sign of Intolerance
or Acceptance?
Stephen P. Schneider, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Kevin B. Smith, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
John R. Hibbing, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Many scholars argue that people who attribute human characteristics to genetic causes also tend to hold politically and
socially problematic attitudes. More speciﬁcally, public acceptance of genetic inﬂuences is believed to be associated with
intolerance, prejudice, and the legitimation of social inequities and laissez-faire policies. We test these expectations with
original data from two nationally representative samples that allow us to identify the American public’s attributional
patterns across 18 diverse traits. Key ﬁndings are (1) genetic attributions are actually more likely to be made by liberals,
not conservatives; (2) genetic attributions are associated with higher, not lower, levels of tolerance of vulnerable individuals; and (3) genetic attributions do not correlate with unseemly racial attitudes.

W

hy do people believe that individuals are the way
they are? This is an important question because
the presumed causes of personal traits and behaviors are known to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the public
attitudes and policies directed at individuals displaying those
traits and behaviors (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008). To fully
understand the attitudes and policies on issues as diverse as
obesity, drug addiction, and sexual orientation is impossible
without understanding what the public believes causes those
traits. Despite this importance, current understanding of such
causal attributions and their political implications is muddled.
A long-held, central assertion of academic theorizing on
the topic is that people who attribute human characteristics
to genetic causes are more likely to be conservative, intolerant, and racist (e.g., Gould 1996; Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 1984). The basic logic follows essentialism: if traits are
seen as unchangeable and map onto existing social differences,
inequalities, and hierarchies, then these differences, inequalities,
and hierarchies are likely to be viewed as part of a natural order
that government policy should not and cannot change (Heine

et al. 2017). Yet for at least one highly salient trait—sexual
orientation—genetic attribution is clearly correlated with more
liberal and tolerant attitudes (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008;
Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2016; Suhay and Jayaratne 2013).
The “born that way” perspective argues that acceptance of diverse sexual orientations is enhanced by recognizing the deep
biological bases of those orientations.
Three factors have prevented empirical investigations
from reconciling these opposing views. First, most previous
studies examine only a small number of traits, making it
difﬁcult to draw broader conclusions. Second, previously employed survey probes tend to lack precision, asking respondents only to assess the importance of genetics to variation in a
given trait even as people undoubtedly have vastly different
thresholds for what counts as “important” (Shostak et al.
2009). Third, available survey items often lump all nongenetic causes together (e.g., Shostak et al. 2009), even though
personal choice and environmental sources are quite different. Survey respondents need a fuller range of options for a
couple of reasons. First, when given the option, the lay public
ascribes substantial inﬂuence speciﬁcally to human agency
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(Condit et al. 2006). In contrast, behavioral genetics methodologies typically do not recognize or estimate personal
choice (personal choice, if real, would be present in the error
term of these estimation techniques, but there would be no
way to distinguish its inﬂuence from measurement error).
Second, the key theoretical construct distinguishing among
causes appears to be the presumed ability of the individual to
control his or her behavior (on controllability, see Weiner
1985). Genetics is perceived by the public as largely beyond
the control of individuals (although recent discoveries on epigenetics raise doubts about this), while the environment contains both uncontrollable (exposure to chemicals while in the
womb) and controllable (avoiding walking right past the bar)
elements. In addition to genetics and the environment, we thus
include a third, distinct attributional category that is clearly
controllable, and we refer to it as personal choice.
In order to improve previous instrumentation strategies,
we measured attributions across a large and diverse set of
traits (the 18 traits listed in table 1) and for each set asked respondents to partition the inﬂuence of three potential causes—

Table 1. Attribution of 18 Traits to Genetics,
the Environment, and Personal Choice (%)
Mean Attribution To:

Trait
Height
Mentally disabled
Handedness
Intelligence
Being homosexual
Athletic ability
Obese
Anxious or neurotic
Extroverted
Aptitude for language
Eating disorder
Conscientiousness
Addicted to drugs
Open to new
experiences
Tolerant of
differences
Criminal record
Political ideology
Deeply religious
Note. N p 600.

Genetics

Environmental
Factors

Personal
Choice

88.52
80.33
73.73
56.12
50.94
50.68
41.77
37.48
35.67
35.13
23.70
23.56
20.62

6.48
13.01
10.51
20.39
15.71
16.33
21.82
36.42
32.75
28.32
37.66
29.32
32.32

5.00
6.66
15.77
23.50
33.36
32.99
36.41
26.11
31.58
36.55
38.64
47.12
47.06

17.69

31.77

50.54

11.12
11.09
8.56
8.42

36.36
33.94
37.30
38.78

52.52
54.97
54.14
52.80

genetics, the environment, and personal choice—so that these
inﬂuences summed to 100%. For example, if people believe
drug addiction to be primarily the result of autonomous
personal choice and only slightly attributable to genetics and
to the environment, they might attribute 70% to personal
choice, 15% to genetics, and 15% to environmental causes.
These items on attributions along with additional items on
political orientation, demographics, tolerance, and racial attitudes were then included in two specially commissioned
surveys administered to nationally representative samples by
YouGov (see the appendix, available online, for sampling details and all item wordings). The ﬁrst survey (N p 600; ﬁelded
in the spring of 2015) focused on the degree to which attributions
covaried with tolerance, and the second (N p 600; ﬁelded in
the late summer of 2015) concentrated on the connection to
trait attributions and attitudes concerning race.
In table 1, we present people’s attributions for the 18 traits
included in the ﬁrst survey. This descriptive information is
interesting and important in its own right. Perceptions of the
role of genetics vary widely depending on the trait. At the top
end, people believe that height and mental disabilities are
shaped primarily by genetics, with only a small role remaining
for the environment and personal choice. At the bottom end,
people believe that genetics plays very little role (under 10%)
in shaping people’s political and religious views. Aptitudes and
personality traits are arrayed in between these extremes. The
wisdom of including personal choice as a distinct option is
apparent in the table. In fact, averaging across all traits, people are more likely to see personal choice than environmental factors as a source of trait variance.
We now turn to our core objective, which is to ascertain
whether individuals who tend to attribute a large role to genetics are more (or less) likely to be politically conservative,
intolerant, and racially prejudiced. Since our data are correlational, they do not indicate whether attributional tendencies
affect ideology, tolerance, and racism, or the other way around.
Fortunately, sorting out the causal order is not necessary because we are only interested in the degree to which genetic
attributions are accompanied by particular political and social attitudes. Given uncertainty about the causal order, instead of using regression analysis, we calculated partial correlations between genetic attributions and the concepts of
interest while controlling for the usual variables: age, income,
education, race (white p 1, nonwhite p 0), sex (female p 1,
male p 0), and frequency of church attendance. Our primary
measure of ideology was YouGov’s standard ﬁve-point item
ranging from 1 p strong liberal to 5 p strong conservative
(alternatives to this measure are analyzed in the appendix).
Our main variable (the degree to which each respondent attributed traits to genetics) was calculated by averaging each
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respondent’s attribution to genetics across all 18 traits in
table 1.
The results are presented in table 2. The demographic
variables suggest that older, less educated, churchgoing individuals are more likely to be conservative, as might have
been expected, but the more relevant ﬁnding is that after
controlling for these variables, there is a negative correlation
between conservatism and the tendency to attribute a wide
variety of traits to genetic causes. In other words, contrary to
conventional wisdom, self-reported liberals are actually more
likely than conservatives to attribute trait variation to genetics; these results hold if, instead of looking at global attributional tendencies, we run separate models for each of the
18 traits (see the appendix). When this is done, we ﬁnd that
for none of the 18 traits are genetic attributions signiﬁcantly
related to being conservative, and for 4 of the 18 traits there
is a signiﬁcant relationship with being liberal.
What about tolerance? Are those who attribute variation
in traits to genetics less likely to be tolerant of diversity, as
conventional wisdom anticipates? In compiling our ﬁrst survey instrument, we singled out 5 of the 18 traits in table 1 for
additional items on tolerance: homosexuality, drug addiction,
obesity, mental disabilities, and political ideology. We tapped
respondents’ openness to and tolerance of individuals with
each of these traits, using items common in the tolerance literature (Schnittker 2000). We created models similar to those
presented in table 2, except that we now include three additional variables. One is labeled “trait used to describe”; it is a
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dummy variable that captures whether the respondent reported that he or she had “a family member or close friend”
who has been described as having that particular trait. Another
is a control for ideological self-placement (described above),
and the third is party identiﬁcation (7 p strong Republican;
1 p strong Democrat). In addition, for the ﬁve tolerance
models, the variable labeled “genetic attribution” changes
from mean attributions across all 18 variables to attributions
for the particular trait (homosexuals, drug addicts, obese
people, etc.) that is being tolerated—or not.
With other variables controlled, the tendency to attribute the source of a trait to genetics correlates positively with
tolerance of homosexuals, drug addicts, the obese, and the
mentally disabled ( p ! :01). The only exception to the pattern is tolerance of those with opposing political beliefs (see
also Suhay and Jayaratne 2013), and this ﬁnding should be
taken with a grain of salt since the relationship appears to be
driven by distorted variance (two-thirds assigned 0% of political beliefs to genetics, and a small number of outliers assigned 100%).
Our ﬁrst survey did not include items on race, so we
conducted a second survey a few months later. To measure
genetic trait attributions, we included 12 of the 18 attributional items from table 1 (height, obesity, eating disorders, anxiety, openness, and religiosity were excluded to make
room for the additional racial items). We focus on just two
racial groups here: whites and African Americans. The survey contained items designed to tap ﬁve aspects of racial

Table 2. Partial Correlations for Ideology, Tolerance, and Genetic Attributions
Tolerance Toward:
Conservative
Ideology

Variable
Genetic attribution
Female
Age
White
Religious attendance
Education
Income
Conservative (ideology)
Republican (partisanship)
Trait used to describe

2.208**
2.033
.206**
.073
.332**
2.099*
.047

Homosexuals

Drug Addicts

Obese
People

Mentally
Disabled

People with Opposite
Ideology

.370**
.113*
2.089
2.017
2.127**
.122**
.025
2.164**
.058
.197**

.172**
.044
2.177**
.159**
.117*
.053
2.011
2.152**
2.105*
.160**

.147**
.059
2.045
.070
2.053
.123**
2.019
2.083
2.022
.219**

.248**
.116*
2.143**
.105*
.092
.030
2.060
2.122**
2.079
.057

2.106**
2.041
2.055
.049
.010
.099**
.016
2.099**
2.037
.026

Note. For conservative ideology, we include the respondents’ average attribution to genetics for all 18 traits. For the ﬁve tolerance measures, we include the
respondents’ attribution to genetics for that particular trait. N p 458.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
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Table 3. Partial Correlations for Racial Attitudes and Genetic Attributions
Variable
Genetic attributions
Female
Age
White
Religious attendance
Education
Income
Conservative (ideology)
Republican (partisanship)

Symbolic Racism

Afﬁrmative Action

Racial Tolerance

Racial Differences

Black Homogeneity

2.119*
.001
.078
.016
2.058
.003
.002
.319**
.219**

.054
.029
2.007
2.175**
.121*
2.041
2.026
2.275**
2.199**

2.101*
.055
2.028
.086
.025
.099*
.109*
2.093
2.082

2.025
2.079
2.051
2.061
2.020
2.130**
.077
.158**
2.006

.002
.033
2.097*
.104*
2.078
.045
2.021
.054
.047

Note. N p 437.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

attitudes. The ﬁrst three were the six-item measure of “symbolic racism” (sometimes referred to as racial resentment), a
two-item indicator of support for race-based afﬁrmative action, and a four-item indicator of racial tolerance structurally
similar to the tolerance measures used in table 2. We also
included a measure of the extent to which people rated African Americans and whites differently on scales of intelligence, athletic ability, criminal tendencies, and conscientiousness, as well as a measure of the extent to which African
Americans are perceived as being more homogeneous than
whites (another indicator of racial biases).
We calculated the partial correlation coefﬁcients for each
of these ﬁve measures of racial attitudes in models parallel to
those employed in table 2, and the results are presented in
table 3. Coefﬁcients for the control variables are not particularly surprising. For four of the ﬁve racial variables, however,
the results are inconsistent with the expectation that genetic
attributions are associated with unenlightened racial attitudes.
The coefﬁcients for afﬁrmative action, perception of racial differences, and differences in perception of group homogeneity
are statistically insigniﬁcant, and the coefﬁcient for symbolic
racism actually suggests that those making genetic attributions
are signiﬁcantly less likely to be racist. Even the one instance
in which genetic attributions seem to be associated with racially unfavorable attitudes—racial tolerance—is questionable
since it drops below statistical signiﬁcance when the analysis
is repeated with only white respondents (see the appendix).
Regardless, the overall picture in table 3 is at odds with the
widespread belief that attributing variation in individual behaviors to genetics correlates with repugnant racial perceptions
and attitudes, appearing instead to have little overall effect.
In sum, we ﬁnd that a key assumption underlying prevailing intellectual dogma—that compassionate, tolerant, ra-

cially enlightened individuals tend to deny that genetics is
relevant to human variation—is factually inaccurate. Rather,
people who accord genetics a role in explaining the different
traits that humans possess are signiﬁcantly more likely to be
politically liberal; signiﬁcantly more likely to be tolerant of
homosexuals, drug addicts, the obese, and those with mental
disabilities; and no more likely to hold unenlightened racial
attitudes. Instead, those who believe traits are under personal
control are the ones who tend to hold less tolerant attitudes.
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